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COMMENTS
notice of the agreement has already been made, equity will impose
a trust upon the property in the hands of such third party in favor
of the promisee.44 It would seem that if the contract to devise is
not recorded and the third party is a bona fide purchaser for value
without notice, there is no remedy available against the property
conveyed or the third party, but the promisee under the contract
will have to 45
resort to an action of damages against the promisor
or his estate.
WMLARD J. WRIGHT.

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE FACT FINDINGS OF THE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
Section 5 of the Trade Commission Act (15 U. S. C. § 45) and
Section 11 of the Clayton Act (15 U. S. C. § 21) provide that "The
findings of the Commission as to facts, if supported by testimony,
shall be conclusive." This follows the form of the usual statutory
provision, and its settled interpretation is that the findings of the
administrative board, if supported by substantial evidence, are
conclusive as to issues of fact.'
The purpose of the creation of the Trade Commission was largely
to establish an administrative tribunal consisting of a body of
persons especially qualified by reason of information, experience
and study to administer the federal program against unfair competition and monopoly. The Trade Commission Act took the function of gathering evidence entirely out of the hands of the courts
and vested it in the Commission. The Commission was given the
power to employ experts and examiners, including attorneys,
econ2
omists, accountants and specialists in various fields. It would
seem, therefore, that by the terms "conclusive, if supported by
testimony" Congress had it in mind that the administrative specialist rather than the court would determine the facts and draw
the inferences therefrom.' The test, then, which both logic and
note (1927). See also Hayes v. Moffatt, 83
5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. Ed., 1936)
"See McCullough v. McCullough, 153
(1929); Osborn v. Hoyt, 181 Cal. 336, 184
Vreeland, 11 N. J. Eq. 370 (1857).
'Van Duyne v. Vreeland, supra note 44.

Mont. 214, 271 Pac. 433 (1928);
§ 1421.
Wash. 625, 631, 280 Pac. 70
Pac. 854 (1919); Van Duyne v.

'Rankin v. Hoyt, 4 How. 327 (U. S. 1846) (custom appraiser); Decatur v. Paulding, 14 Pet. 497 (U. S. 1840) (pension board); United States
v. Ju Joy, 198 U. S. 253 (1905) (immigration 9fficial); Public Clearing
House v. Cayne, 194 U. S. 495 (1904) (post office department); Smelting
Co. v. Kemp, 104 U. S. 636 (1881) (land office); United States v. Williams,
278 U. S. 255 (1929) (director of veterans' bureau); Murray's Lessees
v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 18 How. 272 (U. S. 1856) (revenue
official); Gaines v. Thompson, 7 Wall 347 (U. S. 1869) (secretary of interior); Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U. S. 106 (1904) (postmaster
general); Zakonite v. Wolf, 226 U. S. 272 (1912) (secretary of commerce).
',ollefson, JudicialReview of the Decisions of the Federal Trade Commission, 4 Wis. L. Rv. 257.

$"If the findings of the Interstate Commerce Commission are final,
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reason would seem to require the courts to adopt in determining
whether or not the order of the Commission is to be upheld is
simply this: Are the findings supported by substantial evidence?
The court should not go beyond this to weigh the evidence or
review the findings of fact found by the Commission. In a number
of cases the Circuit Courts of Appeal have treated the findings
of the Commission with due respect and have held that the findings
were supported by evidence and as such were conclusive upon the
courts. 4 But the courts seem to have a natural suspicion of the
functions of administrative officers and bodies and when the Commission presents a case which is not as strong as the court feels it
should be it is more likely than not to set aside the administrative
order and substitute therefor its own opinion. The courts have,
of course, developed and evoked certain doctrines and rationalizations whereby to achieve their ends, while ostensibly obeying the
legislative command. A study of the use of these rationalizations
is necessary in order to determine to what extent the courts actually
consider the fact findings of the Commission sufficient bases for
decisions. This may perhaps best be done by first considering some
of the more illustrative of those cases in which it has been found
that the findings of the Commission were not supported by substantial evidence.
In Federal Trade Commission v. Western Sugar Refining Co.,
et al.,' the respondents, twenty-eight in number, were charged
with stifling and suppressing competition by conspiring among
themselves to prevent the Los Angeles Grocery Co., a competitor,
from obtaining commodities dealt in by it, by threatening not to
buy from, and to boycott the goods of those manufacturers who
should sell to the Los Angeles Grocery Co. The Commission found
that there was conspiracy, and the findings were sustained by the
Circuit Court of Appeals, but in reviewing the evidence the court
said that the testimony must be sufficient as to each one of the
respondents to whom an order to cease and desist is issued, and
it was found that, although there was sufficient testimony to supwhen there is more than a scintilla of evidence to support them, without
an express provision in the statute it can hardly be maintained that the
findinas of the Federal Trade Commission should have less weight."
Hankin, Conclusions of Federal Trade Commission's Findings of Facts
(1925)
23 Micti. L. REV. 233.
4
Western Meat Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 1 F. (2d) 95
(1924); Fox Film Corporation v. Federal Trade Commission, 296 Fed.
353 (1924); Southern Hardware Jobbers Assn. v. Federal Trade Commission, 290 Fed. 773 (1923); Juvenile Shoe Co. v. Federal Txade Commissic 1,289 Fed. 57 (1923); Wholesale Grocers' Assn. v. Federal Trade
Commission, 277 Fed. 657 (1922); Federal Trade Commission v. Winsted
Hosiery Co., 258 U. S.483 (1922); Hill Bros. v. Federal Trade Commisson, 9 F. (2d) 481 (1926); Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 11 F. (2d) 47 (1926); Arkansas Wholesale Grocers' Assn. v.
Federal Trade Commission, 18 F. (2d) 886 (1927); Federal Trade Commission v. Good Grape Co., 45 F. (2d) 70 (1930); Pacific States Paper
Trade Assn. v. Federal Trade Commission, 273 U. S. 52 (1927); Federal
Trade Commission v. Keppel & Bros., 291 U. S. 304 (1934); Harriett
Hubbard Ayer, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 15 F. (2d) 274 (1926);
Cream of Wheat Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 14 F. (2d) 40 (1926).
5275 Fed. 725 (1921).
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port the findings as to all the other respondents, there was not
sufficient evidence to support the findings as to the Western Sugar
Refining Co. and the California-Hawaiian Sugar Refining Co. The
evidence relating to these respondents was as follows: The manager of the Los Angeles Grocery Co. testified that he had made
application to both respondents to be permitted to make direct
purchases of sugar and in each instance the application was refused on the grounds that the business relations of the respondents
with wholesale grocers would be disrupted and that the Los Angeles Grocery Co. was a buyers' exchange for retail dealers rather
than a wholesale grocery. A buyer of the Los Angeles Grocery
Co. testified that he had had the same experience as the manager.
A letter from a sugar broker to the Western Sugar Refining Co.
urged that company not to sell to the Los Angeles Grocery Co. because the wholesale grocers of Southern California would "very
much object". The court in holding this evidence to be insufficient
to support the findings of the Commission with reference to these
respondents said:
"There is no testimony in the record that this course
of action on the part of the two sugar refiners arose from
an actual understanding or agreement between them or
wit'i the Los Angeles jobbers. The testimony proves it
was a concurrence of opinion as to the classification of the
Los Angeles Grocery Co., but we do not find anything
more in the testimony. This classification appears to have
been erroneous, but as long as it was the individual opinion and action of the refiners, it could not be made the
basis of a finding of conspiracy or combination between
the two refiners, or between them and the jobbers, or
between them and the brokers."
In PearsallButter Co. v. Federal Trade Commissio~o the charge
was that the petitioner provided for and fixed a rebate on the
price charged for its oleomargarine, on the condition that its
customers should deal in the petitioner's brand of oleomargarine
exclusively and have no dealings with competitors of the petitioner,
in violation of Section 3 of the Clayton Act, making unlawful
such a contract where its effect "may be to substantially lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly." An appeal was taken
to the United States Supreme Court in which the petitioner contended that the finding that the contracts substantially lessened
competition or tended to create a monopoly was not supported by
evidence. The basis of the finding was in the wording of the
contract itself, the Commission claiming that if the petitioner
entered into a contract that its customers should not deal in the
goods of its competitors, and made inducements in the form of
rebates if such contracts were lived up to, then it followed that
there would be a tendency for those dealers to take advantage
of the offer not to deal with competitors, with the result that competition would be substantially lessened and that there would be
a tendency to create a monopoly. The court held that there was
nothing to justify the conclusion and that what was shown was
1292 Fed. 720 (1923).
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not more than "the mere possibility of the consequences described.
There was nothing from which it might be deduced that the agreement here would, under the circumstances disclosed, possibly lessen
competition or create an actual tendency to monopoly." The finding of the Commission was thus overruled on the ground that there
was a mere scintilla of evidence, but no substantial evidence, to
support it.
In L. B. Silver Co. v. Federal Trade Commission7 the respondent
was charged with using unfair methods of competition in falsely
advertising that the respondent company was'a breeder of hogs
of a distinct breed. The respondent claimed that the finding to
the effect that its hogs were not a separate breed was not supported
by the evidence. There was a sharp and irreconcilable conflict
in the expert opinion evidence touching upon this question. One
group of experts and breeders were of opinion that there cannot
be a distinct breed originated where the blood line goes back to
the old foundation stock. The experts and breeders produced by
the respondent were of the opinion that a distinct breed may be
originated through selection and in-breeding. The court came to
the conclusion, therefore, that as the facts depended on matters of
opinion rather than matters of fact, the testimony was not sufficient
to support the findings of the Commission.
In John Bene & Sons, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission8 the
Commission found that the "Doxol" business of one Proper was
injured by the respondent who sent out to the trade a chemist's
analysis of Proper's product which was inaccurate and false. The
evidence showing the injury to the business and the cause of that
injury was the testimony of a beauty parlor operator, who became
connected with the corporation that succeeded Proper in the manufacture of "Doxol".
She became a director, the holder of one
share of stock, and in her own words "operated the books of the
company". She testified at length as to events that had occurred
long before her connection with the concern, as to correspondence
antedating her connection with Proper's successor, and as to the
contents of books which were never produced. The court in holding that such testimony would not support the finding of the Commission, said:
"We regard the methods pursued in showing Proper's
diminution in sales as lacking in every evidential or testimonial element of value, and opposed to that sense of fairness that is almost instinctive."
In Federal Trade Commission v. The Curtis Publishing Co.'
the respondents were charged with violations of Section 58 of the
Trade Commission Act, and of Section 3 of the Clayton Act. The
Commission found as a fact that the respondent had entered into
contracts with persons to sell its magazines; that such persons contracted not to deal in the products of any other publisher without
the respondent's written consent; that the effect of these contracts
was to substantially lessen competition with respondent's mag'287 Fed. 985 (1923).

8299 Fed. 468 (1924).
'260 U. S. 568 (1923).
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azines and tended to create a monopoly. The finding that the contracts substantially lessened competition was adequately supported
by the testimony of a number of witnesses, showing that many of
the so-called "district agents" of the Curtis Publishing Co. had
been wholesalers in the business of distributing magazines before
they commenced to handle the Curtis publications; that the contracts entered into by the respondent with the wholesalers contained a provision that the wholesalers should not handle publications of any other publisher without permission from the Curtis
Publishing Co.; that in many cases the wholesalers had requested
such permission and the respondents refused it; that many wholesalers had been discharged by the respondent because they insisted
upon handling competing publications, and their places were filled
by new men who would agree to abide by the restrictive clause
of the Curtis contracts. But the respondent claimed that the contracts entered into between the Curtis Publishing Co. and the
dealers were not contracts of sale, but were contracts of agency
and hence not within the provisions of the Clayton Act.
There were two contracts in use. The first was used before the
complaint of the Commission was issued; after the complaint the
contract was modified. Under the first contract the wholesaler had
to remit in advance a sum of money sufficient to prepay the
month's supplies and he did not have the right to return "unsold
copies and get his money back in case he was unsuccessful in selling the specified number of copies. These features of this contract
led to its being expressly declared a contract of sale rather than
of agency in PictorialReview Co. v. Curtis Pubishing Co.10 The
amended contract provided, among other things, that the Curtis
Publishing Co. would assign and deliver to the dealer such stock
of its publications as the company found that the dealer required;
that title should remain with the publisher until the magazines
were sold by the dealer; that all sales must be made for- cash or
at the risk of the dealer; that on sales made the dealer should
have a certain commission; and that the dealer should guarantee
to sell a specified number of copies. The Commission relied on this
evidence to show that the altered contract was in substance, operation and effect the same as the old one and differed from it only
in form. The Circuit Court of Appeals, however, set aside the
finding of the Commission that it was a contract of sale, and found
that it was a contract of agency.
As to the charges under the Federal Trade Commission Act, the
Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the evidence and itself made
additional findings of fact, saying:
"An examination of these findings of fact shows that
no findings whatever have been made in reference to
greater part of the vast volume of testimony in this ease,
and it therefore becomes the duty of this court, with a
view to giving due effect to such testimony, to here recite
what the proofs disclose as to the operations of the defendant company in those matters in which there has
1-255 Fed. 206 (1917).
'270 Fed. 881 (1921).
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been no finding of fact by the Commission."
Then the court proceeded to examine at length the facts in the
case from the testimony as found in the record and made findings
to the effect that the Curtis Publishing Co. had organized a very
extensive and beneficial sales system, giving numerous school boys
an opportunity to earn some money without interfering with their
school work, etc. The court concluded that the respondent was
justified in maintaining its exclusive contracts, in order to prevent
competitors from undermining the valuable and elaborate system
of distribution, and hence that there was no violation of Section 5
of the Trade Commission Act.
This decision was affirmed upon appeal to the United States
Supreme Court.1 2 Mr. Justice McReynolds, speaking for the court,
said :
"Manifestly the court must inquire whether the Commissioners' findings of fact are supported by evidence.
If so supported, they are conclusive. But as the statute
grants jurisdiction to make and enter, upon the pleadings,
testimony and proceedings, a decree affirming, modifying,
or setting aside an order, the court must also have power
to examine the whole record and ascertain for itself the
issues presented and whether there are material facts not
reported by the Commission. If there be substantial evidence relating to such facts from which different conclusions reasonably may be drawn, the matter may be and
ordinarily, we think, should be remanded to the Commission-the primary fact-finding body-with direction
to make additional findings, but if from all the circumstances it clearly appears that in the interest of justice
the controversy should be decided without further delay,
the court has full power under the statute to do so."
The court thus held that while the findings of the Commission
were conclusive, the court could find "additional facts". In expressing doubt as to this view, Mr. Chief Justice Taft, with whom
Mr. Justice Brandeis concurred, said:
"If this means that where it clearly appears that there
is no substantial evidence to support additional findings
necessary to justify the order of the Commission complained of, the court need not remand the case for further
proceedings, I concur in it. It is because it may bear the
construction that the court has discretion to sum up the
evidence pro and con on issues decided by the Commission
and make itself the fact-finding body, that I venture with
deference to question its wisdom and correctness. I think
it of high importance that we should scrupulously comply
with the evident intention of Congress that the F. T. C.
be made the fact-finding body and that the court should
in its rulings preserve the board's character as such, and
not interject its views of the facts where there is any
conflict in the evidence."
"260 U. S. 568 (1923).
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In Standard Oil Co. of N. Y. v. Federal Trade Commission, and
Texas Co. v. Federal Trade Commission,13 it was charged that the
respondents had violated Section 3 of the Clayton Act by leasing
oil tanks and gasoline pumps below cost with the agreement that
the dealers should not use the equipment for the gasoline of competitors. The Commission found as a fact that the restrictive
covenant in the lease tended to substantially lessen competition and
to create a monopoly. In support of such finding the Commission
produced testimony to show that the business of most dealers did
not warrant the use of more than one pump, thus limiting such
dealers to the gasoline of one company; that Standard Oil of New
York, alone, in such a manner monopolized 8,000 dealers; that the
same situation existed with lubricating and illuminating oils; and
that the Standard Oil Co. of New York had already obtained a
practical monopoly in Vermont and New Hampshire. The court
reversed the order of the Commission, simply stating "the leases
of these petitioners do not violate Section 3 of the Clayton Act"-thus holding, in effect, that the leases did not substantially lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly. To the same effect are
Standard Oil Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, Gulf Refining Co.
v. Federal Trade Commission, and Maloney Oil Mfg. Co. v. Federal
Trade Commission.'"
In International Shoe Co. v. Federal Trade Commission 5 the
respondent was charged with a violation of Section 7 of the Clayton
Act. 6 The Commission found as a fact that the products of the
two shoe companies had been in substantial competition with one
another. The Circuit Court of Appeals sustained the findings, but
the Supreme Court, citing with approval the rule of the Curtis
case, reversed the Commission's order that the respondent divest
itself of the stock of the McElwain Shoe Company, and held that
the finding was not supported by the evidence. The Commission
adduced testimony showing, among other things, that in Missouri
where, in 1921, the petitioner sold its product to 4,801 of the 5,150
retail shoe dealers, the McElwain Company sold in the same year,
25,669 dozen pairs of shoes; that the petitioner sold its shoes to
every retailer in Kentucky, Tennessee and Texas, and the McElwain Company sold 8,791 dozen pairs of shoes in the same territory; that petitioner sold to three retail dealers in every four in
Illinois, and the McElwain Company sold 27,547 dozen pairs of
shoes to independent jobbers, retailers and wholesalers in that
state; that in California, where the petitioner sold to seven retailers
in every ten, the McElwain Company sold 11,586 dozen pairs of
shoes to retailers, independent jobbers and wholesalers. The court,
1273 Fed. 478 (1921).
1282 Fed. 81 (1922).
1-280 U. S. 291 (1930).
""No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital of
another corporation engaged also in commerce, where the effect of such
acquisition may be to substantially lessen competition .betveen the corporation whose stock is so acquired and the corporation making the acquisition, or to restrain such commerce in any section or community, or

tend to create a monopoly of any line of commerce." 15 U. S. C. § 18.
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however, "upon a careful review of the record" thought the evidence required a contrary conclusion to that given it by the Commission, saying that because of differences in appearance and
workmanship the product of the two shoe companies appealed to
a different class of consumer and that hence there was no substantial competition in fact. Mr. Justice Stone, in a strong dissenting opinion, concurred in by Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice
Brandeis, said:
"3

* * * there appears to me to be abundant evidence

that the competitive products made by two of the largest
shoe manufacturers in the world, reached the same local
communities through different agencies of distribution;
the one of petitioner, through sales directly to retailers
throughout the United States, the other, of the McElwain
Co., through sales in thirty-eight states, chiefly to wholesalers located in cities, who in turn sold to the retail
trade. From detailed evidence of this type the Commission drew, as I think it reasonably might, the inference
that the rival products, through local retailers, made their
appeal to the same buying public and so were competitive. From a comparative study of the statistics of sales,
the Commission might also, I think, reasonably have found
that the McElwain Co. was successfully competing, by
securing by far the larger proportion of the trade in this
type of shoe, its sale of dress shoes in 1920 being more
than $33,000,000 and in 1921 more than $15,000,000, as
compared with petitioner's sales of its similar dress shoes
of approximately $2,500,000."
It remains to be seen what conclusions may be properly drawn,
specifically from the cases just discussed and generally from the
case law on the subject. It has already been pointed out that there
are many cases in which the fact findings of the Commission have
been treated as conclusive and its order upheld. 7 It is also true
that there are cases where the court's refusal to sustain the Commission's order on the ground that the findings of fact were not
supported by the evidence was eminently correct, the John Bene
case 18 being an example of such an instance. But it is apparent,
from a consideration of the cases here presented, that the courts
do not, in every instance, confine themselves to a determination of
whether there is substantial evidence to support the Commission's
findings. There is often a wide range between what the courts say
they do and what they actually do. 19 Mention has already been
made of the principles and doctrines which purportedly govern
and determine the decision of the court, and it may be helpful at
this time to point out the application of these principles and doe"See note 4 supra.
"8John Bene & Sons, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 299 Fed. 468
(1924), cited supra note 8.
19"With much discussion of principle and doctrine and liberal use of
the legal terminology of proof, the federal courts have dealt freely with
the orders of the Trade Commission." MCFARLAND, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF
THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND

page 34.

INTERSTATE

COMMERCE COMISSION,
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trines to the cases just discussed.
The judgment of the Commission as to matters of fact are, by
the statute, made conclusive, where supported by testimony, but
matters of law are always reviewable by the courts. Congress
obviously intended this division of authority between the Commission and the courts. 2 0 As the borderline between matters of law
and matters of fact is so often vague and undefined, and law and
fact so inextricably mixed, it is apparent that the court is here
given considerable scope in reviewing the findings of the Commis2
sion and setting its orders aside where the court so desires. '
22
Thus, in the Curtis case, the court's disposition of the charge
under the Clayton Act may be explained on the ground that the
question of whether the contracts were those of sale or of agency
was treated by the courts as one of law, rather than one of fact, and
hence the court properly went into the evidence and gave it its
own interpretation.2 3 It should be noted in this connection that
when the facts in the case have been established, the question
whether or not the practice complained of constitutes a violation
of the law is ultimately a question for the courts.2 4 Thus, as'illustrated by the PearsallButter Co. case,215 the construction of a contract, after it is established that it is one of sale, to determine
whether it is in violation of the law, is in the final analysis for the
courts to decide.
In L. B. Silver Co. v. Federal Trade Commissioi2 - the Commission made the finding of fact in question upon the testimony of
disinterested persons, including experts, raisers of pure bred hogs,
veterinarians, stock buyers, and on statements found in the writings of experts. The court, nevertheless, refused to sustain the
Commission's finding on the ground that it was really a finding of
opinion, and hence not conclusive. The court appears here to have
"President Wilson recommended the Commission "as a clearing house
for the facts".
mMCFARLMD, 1933, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
"Although determinations
AND THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COlMUSSION:
of fact by the Trade Commission are made conclusive, abstract consideration of the evidence and the treatment of each part of the record of
some form of 'question of law' has been the means for substitution of
the judgment of courts for the decisions of the Commission * * * so far
as the experience of the Interstate Commerce Commission and Federal
Trade Commission disclose, the distinction between 'law and fact' neither
makes for consistency nor provides a workable separation."
"Federal Trade Commission v. The Curtis Publishing Co., 260 U. S.
568 (1923) supra note 9.
""Judged by its terms, we think this contract is one of agency, not
of sale upon condition, and the record reveals no surrounding circumstances sufficient to give it a different character." 260 U. S. 568, at 581.
2"The courts hold that since the Trade Commission Act and the Clayton Act do not define such terms as unfair methods of competition and
what may substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly,
and since the exact meaning of such terms is in dispute, it is for the
courts and not for the Commission to determine ultimately their meaning." Tollefson, Judicial Review of the Decisions of the Federal Trade
Commission (1927) 4 Wis. L. REV. 257, 281.
"Pearsall Dutter Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 292 Fed. 720 (1923)
supra note 6.
11287 Fed. 985 (1923) supra note 7.
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found a handy device for circumventing the statute. In the very
nature of the case the finding of fact by an administrative agency
is often the opinion of that body based on the evidence it has been
able to gather. 7 If an expert could have reasonably arrived at the
findings of fact, as found, upon the basis of the evidence presented,
it would seem that the Commission has acted within the scope of
the statute as intended by Congress. It should make no difference
that the court upon a consideration of the same evidence would
make a different finding of fact. Thus, in the instant case there
was ample testimony to support the finding of the Commission that
the respondent's hogs were not a separate breed. The evidence pro
and con was for the Commission to consider, and if, in its discretion, it chose to accept the testimony of one group of experts rather
than that of the other group, its findings should, nevertheless, have
been sustained. Another example of the court's use of this device
is found in the opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals in Raladam
Co. v. Federal Trade Commission,28 the court holding that the
Commission's finding that Marmola was "unsafe and unscientific"
was merely a statement of opinion. 29 The Supreme Court, ° in
upholding the Circuit Court of Appeals chose to do so, however,
on other grounds, i. e., that there was no showing of injury to competitors.
Federal Trade Commission v. The Curtis Publishing Co.2 may
well be considered the leading case. As we have already seen, the
court in that case held that as Section 5 of the Trade Commission
Act grants jurisdiction to make and enter upon the pleadings, testimony and proceedings a decree affirming, modifying or setting
aside, the order of the Commission, the court has the power to
examine the whole record and to consider not only the facts found
by the Commission, but also the proofs which the Commission took,
but upon which it made no findings-i. e., that the court may make
additional fact findings upon which to base its decision. This interpretation of the statute, making the court as well as the Commission a fact-finding body and making the Commission the "primary" fact-finding body merely, is in utter disregard of the
evident intent of Congress, for the Commission's findings, though
supported by evidence, cannot be conclusive if the court may find
and rest its judgment on other facts. This doctrine of "other
facts" has been applied in subsequent cases 2 and affords an easy
""The difficulty in the relation of courts to administrative agencies is
enhanced by the peculiar character of administrative findings of fact.
The dispute usually does not turn upon the truth or falsity of the facts
established by the Commission, but upon the truth or falsity of its conclusions, i. e., either the completeness of the facts to serve as a basis
of judgment, or their interpretation and effect. These conclusions must
in the nature of things be largely matters of opinion, and the difference
between law and fact becomes obscure." FREUND, HISTORICAL SURVEY IN
GROWTH OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW

(1923), page 32.

"42 F. (2d) 430 (1930).
"At pages 432-435.
30283 U. S. 643 (1931).
"260 U. S. 468 (1923), supra note 9.
"-James S. Kirk Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 59 F. (2d) 179
(1932); Federal Trade Commission v. Paramount Famous-Lasky Corp.,

COMMENTS
way out for the court where it feels it desirable to set aside the
order of the Commission. 3
34
The Gasoline Pump cases and the InternationalShoe Co. case
are illustrative of the fact that the court, on occasions. completely
ignores the statute and simply declares that the findings of fact
made by the Commission are wrong. These cases certainly cannot
be reconciled with the general law as to the findings of fact by
administrative bodies. In the Gasoline Pump case there was evidence to show that the contracts did substantially lessen competition and tend to create a monopoly. The court, however, went into
the evidence and substituted its opinion for the conclusion of the
Commission.
The authority of administrative bodies depends, generally, upon
the statutes which create them or define their powers. The action
of an administrative agency must be within the scope of the authority conferred by law, and the acts of such an agency are void where
it acts without jurisdiction. For this reason the Commission cannot
be the final arbiter of its own jurisdiction, and administrative determinations of jurisdiction are reviewable by the courts. Hence,
findings of fact which furnish the basis of the Commission's jurisdiction are not conclusive and it is for the courts and not for the
Commission ultimately to determine what constitutes unfair methods of competition. 5 The doctrine of "jurisdictional facts" puts
a necessary and legitimate limitation upon the fact-finding power
of administrative bodies. No criticism can fairly be made so long
as its use is confined to preventing the administrative tribunal from
exercising powers greater than those delegated to it by the legislature.
The Supreme Court announced, in the case of Crowell v. Benson, 6 a doctrine of "constitutional fact" which possibly may be
applied to cases involving the Federal Trade Commission and used
by the courts to set aside the orders of that body. In that case it
was held that with respect to the review of an award made by a
deputy commissioner under the Federal Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act that the petitioner was entitled
to a hearing de novo in a federal court and an independent judicial
determination of the questions of the existence of the relation of
master and servant and whether the injury took place on navigable
waters-i. e., facts upon the existence of which the constitutional
power of Congress to legislate in the matter depended. Thus, if
"fundamental rights" depend upon the facts, there is no administrative finality as to those facts. It has been suggested by Professor
John Dickinson that almost any question in the field of government
regulation could be translated into a question of constitutional right
under the language of Crowell v. Benson, so as to require independent jurisdictional determination. However, there are numer57 F. (2d) 152 (1932).
Standard Oil Co. of N. Y. v. Federal Trade Commission, and Texas
Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 273 Fed. 478 (1921), supra note 13.
3'280 U. S. 291 (1930), supra note 15.
"'Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz, 257 U. S. 421 (1920).
285 U. S. 22 (1932).
"Dickinson, Crowell v. Benson; Jvdicial Review of Administrative
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ous cases upholding administrative finality in other fields, wherein
it can be said with equal force that constitutional rights are at stake
and it is thought that the rule laid down in the Crowell case is not
apt to be extended to cover situations other than those to which it
has already been applied'38--i. e., the situations as found in the
Crowell case and to a review of rate orders of public service
bodies.39 The doctrine remains, however, a potential weapon for
the court's use.
The Commission, in its investigations, is not bound, as are courts,
to the general rules as to the admissibility of evidence. 40 The Commission has, generally, been allowed a wide discretion in the admission or exclusion of evidence. 41 But while the Commission is not
restricted to the taking of legally competent and relevant testimony
or evidence, it seems that the kind of evidence that should be admitted and the competency of a witness is ultimately for the courts
to pass upon in the absence of other substantial evidence.42 However, the relative weight of the evidence and the credibility of the
testimony is, supposedly, a matter for the Trade Commission alone
to decide. 43 It was held in the InternationalShoe Co. case supra,
however, that the Commission was bound to accept the statements
of the officers of the respondent to the effect that there was no real
competition in respect to particular products where no reason appeared for doubting their accuracy of observation or credibility,
illustrating the fact that in spite of the lip-service they may pay
to the rule, the courts do not hesitate on occasion to determine for
themselves the weight of the evidence.
There seems to be a tendency on the part of the courts of late
years to give more weight to the findings of the Commission and
to permit the scope of its activities to be widened. This tendency
was foreshadowed by the vigorous minority opinion of Chief Justice Taft in the Curtis case. 44 In Moir v. Federal Trade CommisDetermination of Questions of Constitutional Fact (1932) 80

U.

OF PA.

L. REV. 1055, 1077.
"Comment (1937) 25 CALIF. L. REV. 315-321.
"St. Joseph Stock Yards Company v. U. S. 298 U. S. 38 (1936); Note
(1936) 50 KAN. L. REv, 78; and Baltimore & Ohio Ry. Co. v. U. S., 298
U. S.349 (1936).
It is believed that the majority opinion in the Crowell case based the
requirement of a judicial trial de novo as to "fundamental" or "jurisdictional" facts in that case upon the judiciary article, Article III, of the
U. S. Constitution. Comment (1933) 21 CALIF. L. REV. 266.
"Wigmore, Administrative Board Rules (1922) 17 ILL. L. REV. 263;
WIcmORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923), p. 27.
""The weight of authority is that the acceptance or exclusion of such
testimony is a matter of discretion." Federal Trade Commission v. Good
Grape Co., 45 F. (2d)

70, 72 (1930).

"John Bene & Sons v. Federal Trade Commission, 299 Fed. 468 (1924);
Hill Bros. v. Federal Trade Commission, 9 F. (2d) 481 (1926); Ark.
Wholesale Grocers' Assn. v. Federal Trade Commission, 18 F. (2d) 866
(1927).
"Cream of Wheat Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 14 F. (2d) 40
(1926); Federal Trade Commission v. Good Grape Co., 45 F. (2d) 70
(1930); Wholesale Grocers' Assn. v. Federal Trade Commission, 277 Fed.
657 (1922).
"B'ut compare: "Nevertheless this 'doubt' and cautionary concurring
opinion has not stayed actual practice. From the beginning the courts
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sion,4 5 decided in 1926, the court quoted with approval from the
opinion of doubt of Chief Justice Taft in the Curtis case, to the
effect that the character of the Commission should be preserved as
the fact-finding body and that the court should not interject its
views where there is any conflict in the evidence. In the Hill Bros."
and Arkansas Wholesale Grocers' Association cases, 47 decided in
1926 and 1927, respectively, there are strong statements to the
effect that the courts should confine themselves to questions of
whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence and
that they should not go beyond this to weigh the evidence or review
the findings of fact found by the Commission. In Pacific States
Paper Trade Assn. v. Federal Trade Commission,4 8 decided in
1927, the Supreme Court announced that the "weight to be given
to the facts and circumstances, * * * as Well as the inferences
reasonably to be drawn from them is for the Commission," and
while, as we have seen, the court has not followed this rule in the
past and subsequently departed from it in the InternationalShoe
Co. case,49 decided in 1930, the latter case contained a strong dissent by Justice Stone, concurred in by Justices Holmes and Brandeis. The significance of this dissent is that it indicates the strong
and fixed opinion of the then minority membership of the Supreme
Court, and it is quite possible that this view is now, as a result of
the recent changes in the personnel of our highest tribunal, the
rule of the court itself. In the case of the Algona Lumber Co. v.
0
Federal Trade Commission,"
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit weighed the evidence and then declared that there
was none to support the conclisions reached. The Supreme Court,5
in reversing the decision and reprimanding the lower court for
merely paying "lip-service" to the words of the statute, said:
"What the court did was to make its own appraisal of
the testimony, picking and choosing for itself among uncertain and conflicting inferences. Statute and Decision
forbid that exercise of power."
The latest enunciation of the Supreme Court on this subject is in
the case of the Federal Trade Commission v. Standard Education
Soc., 5 2 decided in 1937, in which the court reversed the Circuit
Court of Appeals in order to sustain the findings of the Commission that respondent's practice in furthering sales of its products
was "unfair, false, deceptive and misleading". Mr. Justice Black,
speaking for the court, said:
"The courts cannot pick and choose bits of evidence to
have determined the weight of the evidence and have substituted their
judgment for the conclusions of the Commission." MCFARLAND, JUDICIAL
CONTROL
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MISSION, page 33.
"312 F. (2d) 22 (1926).

"Hill Bros. v. Federal Trade Commission. 9 F. (2d) 481 (1926).
"Arkansas Wholesale Grocers' Assn. v. Federal Trade Commission, 18
F. (2d) 866 (1927).
"8273 U. S. 52, 63 (1927).

"280 U. S. 291 (1930).
-64 F. (2d) 618 (1937).
"291 U. S. 67 (1934).
"302 U. S. 112 (1937).
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make findings of fact contrary to the findings of the Commission. "
This is probably the court's strongest unqualified statement on the
finality of the Commission's fact finding. 3 The Supreme Court, in
1934, expressly recognized for the first time, that the Commission
is a board of experts, when Mr. Justice Stone, speaking for the
court in Federal Trade Commission v. Keppel,54 acknowledged that
the Trade Commission "was created with the avowed purpose of
lodging the administrative functions committed to it in 'a body
specially competent to deal with them by reasons of information,
experience and careful study of the business and economic conditions of the industry affected', and it was organized in such a manner, with respect to the length and expiration of the terms of
office of its members, as would 'give to them an opportunity to
acquire the'expertness in dealing with these special questions concerning industry that comes from experience'." These cases indicate quie clearly that the courts are taking a more sympathetic
view of the Commission's work than they formerly did-largely
because the Commission is becoming more experienced and efficient
and is apparently taking greater care to fulfill the requirements
of due process of law. All signs indicate that in the future the
court will be much less prone to go beyond a determination of
whether there is substantial evidence to support the findings. In
the recent case of Morgan v. United States5 one of the allegations
of error was that the order of the Secretary of Agriculture fixing
maximum rates for livestock sales commissions at the Kansas City
stockyards was arbitrary and unsupported by substantial evidence.
The Supreme Court, however, without mentioning this point, decided for the petitioner by declaring that there had not been a
compliance with the requirements of a fair and open hearing. This
might be deemed to indicate that the court in the future will give
due weight to the fact findings of administrative tribunals where
supported by evidence, and will safeguard the citizen from abuse
of administrative process by requiring a strict observance of the
requirements of a fair and open hearing.
It has been shown that the provisions of the Trade Commission
Act and the Clayton Act that "the findings of the Commission as
to facts, if supported by testimony, shall be conclusive" has been
honored by the courts almost as much in the breach as in the
observance. When a court is unconvinced by the findings of the
Commission it has little difficulty in evading the statute where it
deems that desirable. It need simply find that it is a question of
"law" and not of "fact", or a matter of "opinion", or the court
may find "other facts" or determine for itself as to "jurisdictional" or "constitutional" facts. Indeed, in many cases the court
has merely declared that in fact there was no evidence to support
the findings. As a result it cannot be said that any matters can be,
in all events, conclusively determined by the Commission, for even
'See 5 U. OF Cir. L. REV. 495.
'291 U. S. 304 (1934).
15304 U. S. 1.
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as to findings involving chiefly questions of physical fact the courts
have gone back of the findings of the Commission. Nevertheless,
though the provisions of the statute have been frequently nullified
in practice, it may be said that in the majority of instances the
findings of the Commission were given due weight and certainly
this is true of the later cases, the courts seeming much more prone
than formerly to consider the fact findings of the Commission a
sufficient basis for orders. In conclusion, it cannot be said that the
case material to date can be reconciled or reduced to a logical system. The courts seem to have exercised a wide and almost unpredictable freedom in reviewing the findings of fact of the Trade
Commission.
WmLiAm G. DAm~s.

